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 This paper asks: how does the presence of a unifying foreign threat affect party 
cohesion and bipartisanship in the United States House of Representatives? 
Understanding congressional response to such events is crucial in interpreting U.S. 
foreign policy decisions and forecasting future responses to rising foreign threats. Using a 
unique dataset containing roll-call voting records, individual characteristics of legislators, 
and information about bill content, I created an ideology score for each member of the 
House based on foreign policy votes only (Foreign Policy NOMINATE). Using these 
scores, I analyze the distance between members’ original NOMINATE scores and the 
Foreign Policy Nominate scores, as well as party-level cohesion and inter-party 
polarization from 1918 – 2013. 
 I find that both parties moderate their positions on foreign policy (relative to all 
other issues) during a period of foreign threat; the substantive effect, however, is modest. 
I also find that party cohesion on foreign policy is lower than on other issues, and that 
party cohesion and polarization do not appear to be influenced by the presence of a 







International Threats and United States Congressional Behavior from 1981 – 2013  
Elizabeth Randall 
 
This paper explores the relationship between a foreign threat and the behavior of 
members of Congress. Understanding how members of Congress respond to potentially 
threatening international situations can provide important insight into foreign policy and 
future responses to new threats. I use information about how legislators vote, their 
ideology and party, and the topic of legislation to measure how liberal or conservative 
members of Congress are on foreign policy legislation. This allows me to analyze both 
how members of Congress behave inside their parties and how they interact with the 
other party, or in other words, intraparty cohesion and interparty polarization. 
I find that the parties moderate their positions on foreign policy (relative to all 
other issues) when a foreign threat is present and the majority in Congress will approach 
foreign policy from a more moderate angle than the minority party at times of foreign 
threat; these effects, however, are substantively modest. I also find that party members 
agree amongst themselves less on foreign policy than on other issues. My results indicate 
that internal party behavior and interactions between parties are not strongly affected by 
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Since 1964, party cohesion increased, while bipartisanship significantly declined 
— these phenomena resulted from southern Democrats switching to the Republican party 
after the Civil Rights Act passed under President Johnson (Aldrich & Rohde, 2000). Even 
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which should have increased interparty 
agreement, we see that bipartisanship largely maintained its downward trend. Yet, it is 
often said that American voters are not concerned with foreign policy issues (Hyrnowski, 
2020), which implies that foreign policy is possibly one issue area where these trends of 
heightened party cohesion and reduced bipartisanship may not manifest to the same 
extent. After all, nothing has quite as unifying an affect as a looming threat from a 
foreign enemy. 
This paper asks: how does the presence of a unifying foreign threat affect party 
cohesion and bipartisanship in the United States House of Representatives? 
Understanding how national security hazards may affect congressional behavior is 
essential for interpreting and forecasting the nation’s response to such events.  The rise of 
China precipitates fears of another potential grand power rivalry in the near future, as 
well as brings up a practical question about the U.S. domestic politics — shall we 
observe more bipartisanship if China is viewed as a rival threatening U.S. hegemony? 
Will there be a gap in bipartisanship between domestic and foreign policy? Examining 
the past history of congressional response to the USSR and then 9/11 allows us to better 





 To answer this question, I first build the argument that members of the House are 
careful about their voting because they do not always know which votes will become 
controversial. Intraparty cohesion, the degree to which party members behave alike on a 
variety of issues (e.g., Grumm 1964; Krehbiel, 2000) has been rising since the 1970s 
when southern Democrats realigned themselves with Republicans (e.g., Aldrich & 
Rohde, 2000; Cox & McCubbins, 1991). A number of factors predict (to varying degrees) 
divergence from party positions, including expertise, regional interests, and majority 
party status; the international environment has, however, been overlooked by the extant 
literature as a possible determinant of intraparty cohesion.  
In contrast, interparty cooperation, known as bipartisanship, has declined since 
the 1970s when more members of Congress began to strongly identify with their party 
and have subsequently moved closer to their party extremes (e.g., Harbridge, Malhotra, & 
Harrison, 2014; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984). The decline in bipartisanship has been almost 
entirely uninterrupted and has persisted across domestic and foreign policy issues (e.g., 
Flynn, 2014; McCormick &Wittkopf, 1990).  
Congress’s involvement in foreign policy has changed throughout American 
history, but legislators generally defer to the president on foreign policy issues when the 
U.S. is facing a national security threat (e.g., Lindsay, 1992; Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011). 
Although much foreign policy literature has underscored that voters know or care little 
about international politics, members of the House are careful about how they vote 
because they never know ex ante which votes will become controversial in their next 
election cycle (e.g., Aldrich, et al. 2006; Baum & Potter, 2008). One therefore should 




consideration by the members as on other issue areas. No extant work systematically 
examines how the international environment shapes inter-party polarization in the US 
House.  
Relying on the conclusions from social psychology, I argue that social identity 
awareness in the face of a threat causes legislators to prioritize their identity as 
Americans over their party identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When faced with an outside 
enemy, legislators can put their party affiliation on the backburner to prioritize their 
national identity and present the challenger with a unified American front rather than a 
fractured partisan one. My hypothesis anticipates that during the times of foreign threat 
presence, bipartisanship rises. This implies that a decline in both the intraparty cohesion 
(because members will cross the isle to compromise with the other party) and inter-party 
polarization (because the gap in average party voting positions should shrink due to 
compromise on foreign policy issues).   
To test this expectation, I use two sets of data. First, the NOMINATE data set by 
Lewis et al. (2021) provides me with measures of overall party cohesion in 1981–2013 
(across all members for each party in each of 16 congresses of this period). This 32-year 
time period provides two windows of perceived foreign threat from different sources: the 
USSR in 1981–1988 and from Al Qaeda in 2001–2005. I also use the rollcall data on the 
House of Representatives in 1981–2013 to create a new Foreign Policy NOMINATE 
score for each member of the House for each congress by using votes on foreign policy 
legislation. Using those scores, I analyze the distance between members’ original 
NOMINATE scores and Foreign Policy NOMINATE scores, as well as party-level 




I find that the presence of a unifying threat decreases the distance between 
NOMINATE scores and Foreign Policy NOMINATE scores for all members of the 
House. Additionally, majority party members’ distance between foreign policy votes and 
all other issue votes widens, suggesting that majority parties moderate their positions on 
foreign policy during a period of perceived threat. There is no significant trend in 
divergence between foreign policy ideology scores and ideology scores for all other 
issues over time. I find that party cohesion on foreign policy is lower than on other issues 
(especially for Democrats); however, party cohesion does not appear to be influenced by 






Trends in Congressional Behavior since 1964: Party Cohesion Rises and Bipartisanship 
Declines 
 This section overviews two big trends in American politics due to southern 
Democrats switching to the Republican party in the post-Civil Rights Act decades: party 
cohesion rose (intraparty behavior), and bipartisanship declined (interparty behavior) in 
the U.S. Congress. 
What is party cohesion? 
Political parties shape behavior and influence Congressional agendas, as well as 
create a mechanism through which constituents can view politicians as representing or 
not representing their views with little effort towards understanding the issues (Grumm, 
1964). Representatives group themselves within the House of Representatives in a variety 
of ways, which are influenced by internal expectations and norms. Through voluntary 
groupings, representatives may diverge from the party line in certain issue areas. Party 
cohesion is the degree to which members of a party vote together as compared to 
members of the opposition party (Grumm 1964; Norpoth, 1976; Volden & Bergman, 
2006). Party affiliation and party cohesion is “rooted in shared policy attitudes;” it allows 
members of the group to rely on certain “experts” to signal how they should support a bill 
in order to reduce the information cost of casting informed votes on a piece of legislation 
(Norpoth, 1976; Krehbiel, 2000). While party line voting is by no means a given, it is 




Congressional procedure and norms have been shaped overtime, influenced both 
by consensus and disagreement about the rules of the House (Bach, 1990, 49). There is 
some disagreement about which norms are the most important – whether majority 
numbers or agenda setting power have more influence over legislative outcomes (Bianco 
& Sened, 2005). Party organization allows “kindred legislative spirits” to solve the 
legislative problems they confront through engaging in the process under a more 
coordinated uniform grouping (Shepsle & Weingast, 1994, 153). Some scholars argue 
that the majority party’s agenda setting power gives them power over legislative 
outcomes because party members want to opt into the benefits provided by majority party 
leadership to ensure their electorate is satisfied with their legislative success (Aldrich & 
Rohde, 1998; Aldrich & Rohde 2000). Krehbiel’s assessment attributes majority party 
power to the number of votes available to advance the party’s legislative priorities (1999, 
2000). Because these groupings are voluntary, studying group behavior can provide 
important insight into the legislators’ incentives that result in which legislation is 
successful and what gets voted on, including foreign policy bills.   
The rise in party cohesion in the past decades 
Scholars have categorized the majority of the twentieth century (Congresses until 
the 1970s) as a period of relatively stable, albeit low, party unity (Cox & McCubbins, 
1991; Clubb & Traugott, 1977). During the late 1960s and 1970s, southern Democrats 
began to contend with black voters in much larger numbers than before, requiring 
southern Democratic candidates to more closely align with northern democrats to win in 
a liberalized Democratic party. While many districts traded their southern Democrat 




liberal district, creating greater unity within the Democratic party (Aldrich & Rohde, 
2000). This explains the significant increase in party cohesion in the 1980s — 
Democratic cohesion in 1987 was higher than it had been since 1909 (Rohde, 1990).   
Determinants of divergent voting 
Expertise is a weak predictor of divergence on the final vote 
One place in which members diverge from their groupings is voting differently in 
committee votes and floor votes as compared to the larger group. Representatives are 
more likely to vote differently than their party on bills that came through their committee 
before coming to a floor vote.  This is known as committee-floor divergence (Carson, 
Finocchario, & Rohde, 2002, 5-6). Increased exposure to the issue and understanding of 
the bill can lead members to vote in opposition to their party when they otherwise would 
not. However, this effect is not present in final passage votes “because many members 
will prefer passing a bill as a whole (even in a slightly altered form) to not passing one at 
all” (Carson, Finocchario, & Rohde, 6).   
Additionally, in final passage votes other members of the party without specific 
knowledge of the subject matter in the bill will look to the committee members they trust 
for cues about whether to support such a bill, which would offset the divergence observed 
in other vote types (Norpoth, 1976). 
Regional interests predict divergence 
Some divergence in voting patterns has also been attributed to distributive 
policies in which the benefits are targeted towards a specific geographic area, but the 




may diverge from the party position to protect or better serve the interests of their 
constituency. This divergence has affected overall party cohesion across Congresses.  
Indeed, decreasing party cohesion has been attributed to “increasing defections by a 
minority regional grouping within each party from the positions taken by the majority 
segment of the party” (Sinclair, 1977, 121).   
These groupings vary in size and membership depending on the subject matter in 
a bill. During the Cold War, non-southern Democrats were the most internationalist while 
their southern party members were the most isolationist (Norpoth, 1976). In the same 
period southern Democrats and Republicans sometimes formed a “conservative 
coalition” on civil rights legislation showing that regional opposition to integration could 
overshadow party loyalty in some cases (Norpoth, 1976, 1161). 
Majority status predicts divergence 
In addition to regional defection, majority party status can increase cohesion within a 
party (Sinclair, 1977, 155). Majority party leadership can create “a structuring coalition, 
stacking the deck in its own favor — both on the floor and in committee — to create a 
kind of legislative cartel that dominates the legislative agenda” (Cox & McCubbins, 
1993, 270). This structure can be used to incentivize members to vote with the party or 
punish members who diverge from the party line (Aldrich & Rohde, 1998). Although 
members of the majority party from vulnerable districts may be more likely to vote 
against the party regardless of benefits derived from adhering to the party’s agenda on a 
given bill (Flinn, 1964), they may feel more pressure to support party cohesion when the 
party enjoys majority status and the preferences of the opposing party are further from the 





What is Bipartisanship? 
Another way to measure behavior in Congress is to look at bipartisanship, 
commonly defined as “the extent to which majorities or near majorities of both parties in 
Congress vote together” (Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011, 181). It is the mechanism by which 
Congress and the President can attain mutual legislative success (McCormick &Wittkopf, 
1990). Bipartisanship is discussed frequently in the public sphere, and a majority of 
Americans believe bipartisan legislation should be the goal of Congress — approval or 
disapproval of Congress often hinges on the public’s perception of cooperation between 
the parties (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014). In the public debate it has 
commonly been insinuated that bipartisanship is preferable to partisanship because it is 
less political and more devoted to principle than to electoral success. Presidents often 
make appeals for the need for more bipartisanship in Congress and, as suggested 
previously, voters evaluate Congress based on their perceived bipartisan cooperation.   
Consistent with this common understanding of the role of bipartisanship in 
American politics as preferable by voters, some scholars identify bipartisanship as an 
electoral strategy used by some to widen a legislator’s appeal to different types of voters 
(Trubowitz & Mellow, 2005). In contrast, other scholars have found that in reality, voters 
prefer their own partisan legislative priorities rather than bipartisan legislation that could 
indicate a loss for their party (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014). Though voters in 
very moderate districts may certainly prefer a candidate who supports a wider range of 




party’s priorities. Understanding party cooperation in Congress is incredibly complex. It 
has changed significantly over the course of American political history.   
The decline in bipartisanship in the past decades 
Inter-party cooperation in Congress is subject to many forces and has changed 
significantly over the course of the past century. In the first decades of the twentieth 
century, partisan conflict was relatively low. The New Deal provided an uptick in 
disagreement between parties, but only had a temporary effect on bipartisanship trends 
(Collie, 1988). Since the 1970s, bipartisanship has been declining as more members of 
Congress identify more strongly with their political party (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011).   
As bipartisanship in Congress has been declining in recent decades, polarization 
has become more deeply entrenched in American politics (Jeong & Quirk, 2019, 58-87).  
Members of Congress represent their party extremes more often than moderate voters 
(Poole & Rosenthal, 1984, 1061). For incumbents, greater levels of partisan loyalty in 
Congress equal greater success in future primary elections, even though ideological 
extremes are often punished in elections (Pyeatt, 2015). Party realignment over the last 
50 years has produced ideologically uniform political parties — that is, Democrats are 
now seen as synonymous with liberal and Republicans with conservative, leaving few 
people to breach the gap between party and ideology (Schultz, 2017; Mason, 2014). This 
has resulted in both parties shifting to the extremes of their ideology leaving few 
representatives from either party to overlap in the middle of the political spectrum 
(Schultz, 2017, 8). Another factor in decreasing bipartisanship is “Affective polarization” 
or the dislike (and in some cases loathing) of one’s political opponents (Iyengar, Sood, & 




lead to higher levels of party cohesion as representatives reach across the aisle less and 
less.   
Bipartisanship in foreign policy: Do partisan politics stop at the water’s edge? 
Scholars have suggested that the fall of the Soviet Union would precipitate a 
permanent decline in congressional bipartisanship if significant efforts to renew 
commitments to bipartisan government were not undertaken, and this decline has been 
substantiated through analysis of roll-call voting (Winik, 1991, 115; McCormick 
&Wittkopf, 1990; Meernik, 1993). Indeed, foreign policy bipartisanship did not increase 
following the events of 9/11 as previous trends suggested it should, showing that the 
decline in domestic bipartisanship was also affecting cross-partisan agreement about 
foreign policy and national security (Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011, 164-165).  
Bipartisanship in foreign policy related legislation has declined consistently due 
to the increased importance of domestic policy considerations across the board (Jeong & 
Quirk, 2019; Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011; Schultz, 2017; Flynn, 2014). 
May External Threats Shape Congressional Behavior? 
What powers does Congress have over U.S. foreign policy? 
Congressional approaches to foreign policy have varied over time, ranging from 
complete deference to the President to more involvement in recent years (Trubowitz & 
Mellow, 2011, 166-168). The constitution grants both Congress and the President 
significant foreign policy powers, so the deference Congress often shows to the executive 
on matters of foreign policy is a political balance rather than institutional. When the 




when the nation views itself as secure Congress pushes back and opposes the president’s 
agenda much more often (Lindsay, 2003). The executive branch has traditionally 
controlled much of the agenda-setting and decision power when it came to foreign policy 
legislation. Despite the apparent disadvantage Congress faces when it comes to foreign 
policy, it still plays an important role in defending their constituents’ immediate 
preferences through the legislative process and through grandstanding (Lindsay, 1992, 
608). I review each of these approaches in turn. 
Legislative process 
The more traditional way Congress can subvert executive branch control of 
foreign policy is through legislative means. Blocking legislation or refusing to approve 
actions abroad can frustrate a president’s foreign policy agenda but is unlikely to occur 
when political conflict could damage a president’s stature against a foreign threat 
(McCormick & Wittkopf, 1991; Lindsay, 2003). When a unifying threat is present, 
opposition to the president’s foreign policy agenda can be viewed as unpatriotic and even 
dangerous so Congress defers to the president (Lindsay, 2003).   
  Members of the House of Representatives are often involved in specific areas of 
foreign policy tied to benefits for their district and are incentivized to participate more 
fully in the creation and passage of foreign policy legislation by electoral factors and 
special interest groups (Jacobs, Lawrence & Page, 2005). As domestic considerations like 
the economy and regional rivalries have become more important to voters, members of 
Congress have become more assertive of their legislative powers over foreign policy 




the end of the Cold War era would significantly diminish congressional bipartisanship on 
foreign policy (McCormick & Wittkopf, 1991). 
Shaping public opinion 
Congress may oppose a president’s foreign policy agenda through public opinion. 
Members of Congress have significant sway over their districts’ views of the executive, 
creating an opportunity for members to raise the cost of a president’s agenda in the court 
of public opinion, particularly when it comes to engagement in risky foreign conflicts 
(Howell & Pevehouse, 2005). Grandstanding allows legislators to draw attention to an 
overlooked foreign policy issue, build public popularity for policy supported by 
Congress, or create enough pushback that a president reverses their course of action 
(Lindsay, 1992).   
 Voters’ Interest in Foreign Policy 
 It is a widely held belief among political scientists that voters have little interest in 
foreign policy and legislators can therefore ignore considerations about electoral 
consequences for decisions they make in relation to that issue area. Scholarship from the 
mid-twentieth century characterized public opinion on foreign policy as irrational, 
uninformed, and inconsistent (Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955). During the Vietnam war, 
the public maintained consistent opposition to the conflict and appeared, in survey data, 
to be both moderate in foreign policy preferences and logical (Verba et al., 1967; Aldrich 
et al, 2006)1. One area in which public opinion on foreign policy is demonstrably stable 
 
1 In this instance, logical refers to the consistency of public opinion. The public is considered logical on 
foreign policy in this literature because they exhibit consistent preferences that only undergo major shifts 




and logical is decreasing support for a conflict as combat deaths increase (Mueller, 1973). 
Aldrich et al. (2006) identify three criteria that must be met in order for public opinion on 
foreign policy to affect how people vote: “ (a) the public must have coherent attitudes 
about foreign policy, (b) the public must be able to access these attitudes when they vote, 
and (c) the political parties must uphold distinct foreign policy platforms so that voters 
can use their attitudes to distinguish between candidates” (496). Outside of academia, 
policy makers often insist that public opinion on foreign policy cannot be trusted (Page & 
Bouton, 2006). 
 Despite disagreement about the effect of public opinion, most scholars agree that 
government consults public opinion on foreign policy creation less than on almost any 
other issue. Verba et al. (1967) contends that even if government doesn’t take public 
approval into account when making decisions, public disapproval over foreign policy can 
influence national elections. The public’s influence on foreign policy changes as a 
conflict continues so that “the public’s influence on foreign policy appears to be lowest 
when it is informationally weakest (typically in early stages of conflicts) but somewhat 
higher in longer conflicts as the information gap dissipates” (Baum & Potter, 2008, 48). 
Despite this trend, the public struggles to access information independent of the mass 
media. In the area of foreign policy, mass media is uniquely reliant on public officers and 
policy makers, so opinions expressed by journalists are often “in harmony with official 
foreign policy” (Page & Bouton, 2006, 27). The public’s difficulty in accessing 
information has been aggravated by social media’s polarizing affects. As voter 
polarization has increased, consensus on foreign policy among leaders and voters has 




secondary to the president and subject to more immediate electoral accountability, 
legislators may consult constituent opinions more frequently than executive branch 
officials.  
Understanding Audience Costs 
During conflict, national executives are subject to audience costs related to 
international engagement and foreign policy. Particularly in a democracy, these costs are 
a significant factor in determining how much or how little a country will engage with an 
enemy and are an important signal for opposing countries to consider (Fearon, 1994). 
National executives fear punishment for unpopular or weak responses to international 
conflict, and that fear conditions their behavior (Fearon, 1994). The cost of backing down 
from a threat has only been empirically shown for executives, however, and may not 
apply to Congress and legislators’ decision-making. 
Electoral Constraints  
Members of the House operate under the assumption that constituents closely 
monitor their behavior. This belief acts as a constraint on roll call voting across all issues. 
According to Richard Fenno, members of Congress always approach reelection with a 
great deal of uncertainty even when their “reelection constituency” is large enough to 
provide a sense of security (1978, 10-12). One of the sources of uncertainty is the 
possibility that an unforeseen or new issue will arise during their campaign for reelection. 
Because of this, legislators are cautious when casting potentially controversial votes 
because they cannot know what will matter to voters in the next election cycle (Fenno, 




taken seriously by policy makers, legislators casting votes on bills relating to foreign 
policy will behave as though that particular vote could become salient in a future 
election. Even though the public generally knows very little about foreign policy, 
legislators cannot be certain that their foreign policy voting record will not be called into 
question in a tough election. Though legislators are certainly familiar with their 
constituents’ preferences, they cannot predict how events will unfold, possibly making a 
seemingly unimportant vote controversial or salient in the future. 
Roll call voting can be particularly important in a future election because “roll 
calls usually are taken on relatively major and relatively controversial issues… few major 
decisions are made without benefit of at least one recorded vote” (Matthews & Stimson, 
1975, 10). Legislators understand that their voting record can be used against them and 
behave accordingly in order to win reelection (Matthews & Stimson, 1975). In addition to 
the caution exercised generally, legislators are even more cautious when they know ahead 
of time that a vote or issue will be controversial. Survey data shows the legislators 
carefully weigh their options on controversial votes. They consider information from a 
variety of sources to inform them about potential outcomes (Sullivan et al. 1993). When 
surveyed about valuable cue-givers, both Democrats and Republicans ranked 
constituency as a one of the most valuable sources of information for voting decisions in 
the area of foreign policy (Sullivan et al. 1993). This shows that even though the public is 
often uninformed or misinformed about foreign policy, legislators still consider how a 
vote could be perceived in the future. 
Members of the House are punished for voting in a way that is inconsistent with 




observed part of their job (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001). This leads 
legislators to fear that one bad vote can wipe out an otherwise favorable voting record 
since they are operating under the assumption that they are closely monitored by 
constituents (Matthews & Stimson, 1975). Electoral safety has been closely linked to 
moderate voting patterns, indicating that voters punish members for voting with party 
extremes, all else equal (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002). Roll-call voting 
patterns can be shaped by constituent preferences as long as a legislator believes they will 
be punished, regardless of voters’ actual response to a particular issue (Erikson, 1990). 
The more a legislator departs from the preferences of their constituents, the more likely 
they are to see a decline in vote-share even if they have a “safe” seat or do not lose office 
(Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, 2002).  
Even though voters may be relatively uninformed on matters of foreign policy, 
legislators may estimate a greater potential cost when casting votes during a period of 
international threat, causing them to be more cautious or more closely consider the 
preferences of their constituents on those votes. If legislators are punished for being too 
extreme, as stated above, this effect could increase when the U.S. is faced with a national 
security threat from a foreign source. Members of the House may estimate the future 
danger of foreign policy votes during that period as higher and moderate their behavior 
accordingly. 
According to social identity theory from social psychology, people often view 
themselves and others primarily as group members, prioritizing their social identity over 
their personal identity (Ellemers & Haslam, 2011). Social identity awareness in the face 




identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When faced with an outside enemy, legislators can put 
their party affiliation on the backburner to prioritize their national identity and present the 
challenger with a unified American front rather than a fractured partisan one. Patriotism 
subsumes party loyalty, making legislators less likely to oppose executive priorities or 
proposals from the other party. 
Hypothesis: The presence of a unifying national security threat will increase 
bipartisanship in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
A rise in bipartisanship implies more inter-isle compromise, which is why in the 
following sections, I focus on intraparty cohesion and inter-party polarization. Greater 
bipartisanship should imply lower cohesion, since more members agree to compromise. 
In addition, bipartisanship implies that polarization, i.e., the gap between each party’s 
average member’s voting position, should decline as well. Therefore, my hypothesis 








To estimate the effect of the presence of a unifying threat on party cohesion and 
bipartisanship on bills relating to foreign policy, an original dataset was assembled; it 
includes data from the Political Institutions and Public Choice Roll-Call Database (PIPC) 
compiled by Michael Crespin and David Rohde,2 Legislative and District Data compiled 
by Ella Foster-Molina,3 and Members’ Votes data from Voteview: Congressional Roll-
Call Votes Database.4  Together these datasets provide information about roll call voting, 
party cohesion, content of legislation, and individual characteristics of bill sponsors.  This 
information was used to produce individual NOMINATE scores for each member on the 
issue of foreign policy.  
The NOMINATE and FP NOINATE scores are aggregated in two ways. The first 
dataset includes 7,059 observations at the individual member level covering the 97th-112th 
congresses (16 congresses during 31 years of 1981–2013); the unit of analysis is 
member-congress. The second dataset includes this information collapsed by congress 
and by party to provide a congress level view of the variables for the same timeframe; the 
unit of analysis is party-congress. 
 
2 Crespin, Michael H. and David Rohde. (2019). Political Institutions and Public Choice Roll-Call 
Database. Retrieved from https://ou.edu/carlalbertcenter/research/pipc-votes/ 
3 Foster-Molina, Ella. (2017). "Historical Congressional Legislation and District Demographics 1972-
2014" https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CI2EPI, Harvard Dataverse, V2, 
UNF:6:yiLGWnus7Bn3psO0Tjzi2A== [fileUNF] 
4 Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 







The dependent variables compare the foreign policy NOMINATE scores 
(hereafter, FPN scores) created for this paper with the DW-NOMINATE scores created 
by Poole and Rosenthal. NOMINATE scores measure a congressional member’s 
ideological position throughout their career. For this paper, the first-dimension score is 
used, which measures economic liberalism or conservatism. Ideology is scored as a 
continuous variable so that -1 is the most liberal and 1 is the most conservative. All 
members of the House in every congress are assigned a value between -1 and 1 based on 
their voting record, with both parties skewing towards the center. 
Foreign Policy legislation is measured using the coding system set up for the 
PIPC Database to track the content of legislation brought to vote in the House of 
Representatives.  The foreign policy category includes immigration, foreign aid, arms 
control, State Department funding, human rights, terrorism, etc.  It is separate from bills 
about defense or funding for other cabinet departments that could be related to foreign 
policy. Using only the votes on foreign policy bills, I created a score using the 
NOMINATE formula for each member of the House in each congress from 1981–2013. 
The scores use the same measurement system as the traditional NOMINATE score so 
that -1 equals the most liberal on foreign policy, 0 is the center, and 1 equals the most 
conservative on foreign policy. In general, foreign policy favored by conservatives is 
associated with hard power, high defense spending, and a “proactive” response to 




solutions to foreign disputes, reduced defense spending, and greater willingness to end 
military involvement overseas (Rubenzer, 2017). 
Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN by Member-Congress 
Table 1 summarizes both the FPN Score and the DW-NOMINATE Score at the 
member-congress level. Table 1 also summarizes the first outcome variable used in the 
regression analyses—the Distance between the DW-NOMINATE and the FPN Score, 
which is as simple difference between these two scores per member per congress; it 
captures the difference between members’ voting behavior on foreign policy issues and 
their voting behavior in all issue areas. This provides an individual-level measure of 
whether foreign policy is distinct from other issue areas.  
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics at the Member Level 
 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
FP-NOMINATE (FPN) Score 6,955 0.00477 0.504 -0.999 0.989 
      
DW-NOMINATE Score   6,955 -0.0029  0.399 -0.766   0.913 
      
Distance between DW-
NOMINATE and FPN 
 6,955 -0.00813  0.355 -1.544  1.657 
      
FPN Democrats 3,734 -0.354  0.355 -0.999   0.885 
      
FPN Republicans 3,221  0.421  0.282 -0.965   0.989 
      
DW-NOMINATE Democrats 3,771 -0.343  0.158 -0.766   0.884 
      
DW-NOMINATE 
Republicans 





The expectation is that when a foreign threat is present, members should be less 
likely to take extreme positions, and instead will be more likely to cooperate with the 
other side. Hypothesis 1 anticipates less cohesion and more bipartisanship in foreign 
policy voting during the times of threat. During both threat periods (1981–1988 and 
2001–2005), Republican presidents held office. Given that the US president has an 
outsized role in directing foreign policy, I expect the Democratic party, the opposition to 
the President, to exhibit lower cohesion, such that some members of the opposition will 
join the President’s party to back his foreign policy when the national interests of the US 
are perceived as being threatened by a rival or challenger. This is why I estimate the 
regressions on the split sample by party to evaluate this dynamic. 
Measures of Cohesion by Party-Congress  
At the party-congress level, party cohesion is captured by four dependent 
variables:  
• Democratic Cohesion on FP, measured as the standard deviation of the 
FPN Score for Democrats.  
• Republican Cohesion on FP, measured as the standard deviation of the 
FPN Score for Republicans.  
• Democratic Cohesion on All Issues, measured as the standard deviation of 
the DW-NOMINATE Score for Democrats.  
• Republican Cohesion on All Issues, measured as the standard deviation of 




The standard deviation reflects variation within each party in each congress. For 
instance, Democratic Cohesion on FP captures the extent to which the Democratic party 
stuck together on foreign policy legislation for the given congress, because standard 
deviation measures the degree to which Democratic party members differ from the 
average Democrat in a given congress. The same is true for Republican Cohesion on FP. 
Similarly, Democratic/Republican Cohesion on All Issues reflects the amount of 
coordination on votes within the Democratic/Republican party respectively on all 
legislation for the given time period.  
Measures of Polarization by Congress 
Additionally, to understand the degree of polarization, I use:  
• Average Democratic FPN Score, measured as the mean for Democrats in a 
given congress.  
• Average Republican FPN Score, measured as the mean for Republicans in 
a given congress.  
• Polarization on FP, measured as the difference-in-means between these 
two FPN scores of the two parties per congress.  
• Average Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score, measured as the mean for 
Democrats in a given congress.  
• Average Republican DW-NOMINATE Score, measured as the mean for 
Republicans in a given congress.  
• Polarization on All Issues, measured as the difference-in-means between 




Using the difference-in-means of FPN Scores for Democrats and Republicans by 
congress provides reflects polarization because it demonstrates the distance between 
Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy bills during a given congress. Similarly, 
the difference-in-means of NOMINATE for Democrats and Republicans by congress 
demonstrates the distance between Democrats and Republicans on all legislation during 
that congress. 
It is expected that Polarization on All Issues (the inter-party gap between the 
NOMINATE scores) grows faster during the times of threat than Polarization on FP (the 
gap between FPN scores).  
Table 2 summarizes all congress-level outcomes.  
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics at the Congress Level  
 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Foreign Policy Score 0.025 0.429  -0.567  0.714  32 
 
     










Democratic Cohesion on FP   0.304  0.106   0.132    0.490    16 
      










NOMINATE Score   0.020   0.374 -0.395    0.469     32 






 -0.346   0.034  -0.395    -0.299 16 









  0.386   0.050   0.306 0.469 16 
    
  
NOMINATE SD   0.151   0.015   0.123 0.194  32 
    
  
Polarization on All Issues  -0.833  0.064  -0.945    -0.758    16 
      
Democratic Cohesion on All Issues   0.152  0.021   0.123    0.195    16 
      
Republican Cohesion on All Issues   0.151  0.007   0.143    0.167    16 
 
     
 
Independent variable External Threat 
This project hypothesizes that the presence of a unifying threat will affect party 
cohesion and bipartisanship over issues relating to foreign policy legislation.  To use the 
presence of a unifying threat as the independent variable the available data is divided into 
two time periods where a threat was present: legislation passed during the perception of 
the USSR as a rival and legislation passed in the years following September 11, 2001. It 
also includes two periods where a threat was not present: the period of time between 
1991 and 2001 and years after 2005. Using these two periods with no serious national 
security risk allows us to compare levels of cohesion and bipartisanship between periods 
of relative emergency and relative peace.  
I use Gallup polls to determine when the public perceives a foreign threat from 
either the USSR or Al-Qaeda.  This results in a binary indicator of External Threat, that 
takes on the value of 1 in years 1981-1988 (the Berlin Wall fell in 1989) and 2001-2004 
and the value of 0 in years 1989-2001 and 2005-2013 (Richman, 1991; Gallup, 2020). 




The 100th and 108th congresses are coded 0.5 to represent a threat during only one year of 
the congressional session. 
For robustness, I also recode External Threat so that in one model, external threat 
takes on the value of 1 in 2001–2002 only; another model includes external threat with a 
value of 1 in 1981–1991 only.  These results are included in the appendix. 
Empirical Strategy  
This paper’s approach is threefold. First, I use a t-test to determine whether the 
means of FPN score and NOMINATE score are meaningfully different over time. 
Second, to evaluate how foreign threats influence individual members’ tendency to widen 
or shrink the gap between their voting behavior on foreign policy as opposed to all other 
issues, I estimate a series of OLS regressions using different subsamples. 
Next, I also use descriptive analyses to investigate the over time variation in these 
scores. I employ time-series plots to visualize how party-level coherence has changed in 







Analysis at the Member-Congress Level 
The primary contribution of this paper is the creation of Foreign Policy 
NOMINATE scores, which allow us to see how members of the House behave on foreign 
policy legislation relative to their general voting behavior. Using these scores and the 
original NOMINATE scores, I test whether the presence of a threat increases party 
cohesion and bipartisanship at the level of individual member. Taking the difference in 
scores allows us to evaluate whether the presence of a (supposedly) unifying threat alters 
voting behavior on foreign policy legislation in a different way than total voting behavior.  
Hypothesis 1 anticipates more bipartisanship (i.e. less cohesion and less 
polarization) on foreign policy issues under threat. During both threat periods (1981–
1988 and 2001–2005), Republican presidents held office. Given that the US president has 
an outsized role in directing foreign policy, the Democratic party, the opposition to the 
President, is expected to exhibit lower cohesion, such that some members of the 
opposition will join the President’s party to back his foreign policy. This is why I 
estimate OLS regressions on the split sample by party to evaluate this dynamic. Table 3 
demonstrates the results of the OLS analysis at the member-congress level. The 
dependent variable in all models is Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN.  
 I first use a t-test to determine whether the means of FPN score and NOMINATE 
score for Democrats is meaningfully systematically different over time. In repeated 
samples, the true difference-in-means falls within [-0.024, 0.0009] 95% of the time. The 
test results in a p-value of 0.06853, which is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. I 




for Republicans are systematically different over time. In repeated samples, the true 
difference-in-means falls within [0.0194, 0.0417] 95% of the time. The test results in a p-
value of 7.831e-0, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and is discernible 
from 0. This result implies that Democrats’ overall voting in 1981–2013 did not 
systematically differ on foreign policy issues from all other issues, while Republicans’ 
average voting on foreign policy was systematically more moderate (closer to 0) than on 
all other issues. 
 
Table 3 
 The Impact of External Threat on Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN 
  (2)  (3) 






















Congress FEs  Yes  Yes 
N    3,734     3,221 
Adjusted R2    0.2142     0.3838 
Note: Numbers in cells are coefficient estimates, standard errors are in 
parentheses. Models fit with OLS regression. Dependent variable is Distance 
between DW-NOMINATE and FPN. * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Models 2 and 3 use the subsamples of only Democrats and only Republicans 
respectively. The fit of Models 2 and 3 yield adjusted R2 indicators of 0.21 and 0.38 
respectively. In Model 2, the presence of a unifying threat reduces the gap between the 




3.2% of the variation in the Democrats’ distance between the two scores. In Model 3, the 
presence of a unifying threat also reduces the gap between the two scores by 0.133 units 
for Republicans in the House, which is equivalent to explaining 1% of the Republicans’ 
variation in the distance between the two scores. This suggests that both parties moderate 
their positions during a period of foreign threat. 
Consider Table 4, in which I further split the sample by party (Models 4–5 
include only Democrats vs. Models 6–7 include only Republicans) and by majority 
control. In multiple congresses the House majority was controlled by the party in 
opposition to the President: Democrats held majorities during the entire Reagan and G. 
H.W. Bush presidencies and lost control under Clinton in the 1994 midterms, such that 
Republicans held majorities in 104th–109th congresses in 1995–2007. Democrats then 
controlled 110 and 111th congresses under G.W. Bush and Obama in 2007–2011. The last 
112th congress of 2011–2013 included in the data set was controlled by Republicans 
under President Obama.  
 
Table 4 
 The Impact of External Threat on Distance between DW-NOMINATE and FPN, 
Accounting for Majority Control 
  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
  Democrats Republicans 
  Dem House 
Control 








0.163***  -0.082*** -0.254*** 0.112*** 
 
 
(0.028)  (0.021) (0.028) (0.017) 
Intercept 
 
-0.294***  0.198*** 0.314*** -.0116** 
 
 




Congress FEs  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N  2,306  1,428 1,625 1,596 
Adjusted R2  0.3781  0.276 0.604 0.309 
Note: Numbers in cells are coefficient estimates, standard errors are in 
parentheses. Models fit with OLS regression. Dependent variable is Distance 
between DW-NOMINATE and FPN. * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
A curious pattern emerges: when a party controls the majority in the House 
(Models 4 and 7) the members’ distance between voting on foreign policy and all other 
issues widens. In contrast, when a party is the minority in the House (Models 5 and 6), 
the distance between the two scores shrinks. This implies that majorities—in the face of a 
foreign threat—moderate their positions on foreign policy to a greater extent (less 
alignment between FP and DW-NOMINATE scores) than minorities (a smaller distance 
implies more alignment). This pattern is somewhat puzzling, since Democrats controlled 
the majority facing a threat from the USSR in 1981–1988 under a Republican president, 
but Republicans were in the majority in 2001–2005 under G.W. Bush, a Republican 
president. Further qualitative examination is needed to substantiate this finding. 
In particular, External Threat boosts the gap in the two scores for the majority 
party members by 0.16 units for Democrats in Model 4 (explains 1.4% of variation in the 
dependent variable) and by 0.11 units for Republicans in Model 7 (explains 2.5% of 
variation in the outcome).  
Minority party members (Models 5 and 6) tend to vote such that the distance 
between the two scores shrinks; this effect is especially large for Republicans in Model 6. 
External Threat reduces the gap in the two scores for the minority party members by 0.08 
units for Democrats in Model 5 (explains 1% of variation in the outcome) and by 0.25 




in Model 6 is by far the largest substantive effect across all Models, implying that until 
1988, Republicans tended to have a 4.7% narrower gap between their foreign policy 
votes and all other issues than they did during under H.W. Bush presidency and in 2007–
2011 during the Obama presidency. 
Analysis at the Party-Congress Level 
Figures 1–4 chart the parties’ voting behavior in the House across congresses. In 
all plots, red markers indicate Republicans, while Democrats are represented in blue. 
Figures 1–2 visualize party-level average voting per congress based on the FP-
NOMINATE scores (Figure 1) and based on the DW-NOMINATE scores (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1  





Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate 
Republicans. Average Democratic FPN Score is the mean for Democrats in a 
given congress. Average Republican FPN Score is the mean for Republicans in a 
given congress.  
 
Two patterns emerge. First, Republicans tend to espouse more conservative 
positions (more positive scores on the NOMINATE scale of -1 to 1) than Democrats in 
foreign policy issues as well as all issue areas. Second, the FPN score is characterized by 
greater variation from congress to congress than the DW-NOMINATE party-level score. 
In particular, two congresses stand out: in the 99th congress (1985–1987), Democrats had 
a higher average of 0.35 on foreign policy than Republicans (-0.47); in the 111th congress 
(2009 –2011), the gap between the two parties was very narrow (-0.05 for Democrats vs. 
0.14 for Republicans). This variation in the FPN scores (and the corresponding lack of 
variation in the DW-NOMINATE scores, which appear as almost straight lines diverging 
over time) indicates that foreign policy voting behavior can be modified by presence or 











Figure 2  
Average Democratic and Republican DW-NOMINATE Scores in 97th–112th Congresses 
 
 
Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate 
Republicans. Average Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score is the mean for 
Democrats in a given congress. Average Republican DW-NOMINATE Score is the 
mean for Republicans in a given congress.  
 
 My argument implied that that the gap between parties’ DW-NOMINATE scores 
would grow faster over time than in FPN scores, but that does not appear to be the case. 
While party-level DW-NOMINATE scores diverge from each other over time, the FPN 








Figure 3  
Democratic and Republican Cohesion on Foreign Policy in 97th–112th Congresses 
 
Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate 
Republicans. Democratic Cohesion on FP is the standard deviation of the FPN 
Score for Democrats, while Republican Cohesion on FP is the standard deviation 
of the FPN Score for Republicans. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show that the intraparty cohesion indicators, measured as standard 
deviations for FPN scores in Figure 3 and as standard deviations for the DW-
NOMINATE scores in Figure 4. These figures indicate that, first, Democrats as a party 
have substantially more variation in voting on foreign policy than Republicans, i.e., 
Democrats exhibit lower coherence as a party on foreign policy than Republicans do. In 
all congresses (except the 111th congress of 2009 –2011), the standard deviation for 




Republican FPN score (the minimum is 0.97 times in the 111th congress and 3 times 
larger in the 107th congress). 
Second, both Democrats and Republicans are less cohesive on foreign policy 
(Figure 3) than on all issues (Figure 4). Indeed, while the average the Democratic 
Cohesion on FP is 0.3, the average the Democratic Cohesion on All Issues is 0.15. For 
Republicans the difference is less pronounced: the average the Republican Cohesion on 
FP is 0.21, the average the Republican Cohesion on All Issues is 0.15. For Democrats, 
their cohesion on all issues has increased over time (the standard deviation has declined 





















Democratic and Republican Cohesion on All Issues in 97th–112th Congresses 
 
Note: The blue markers indicate Democrats, the red markers indicate 
Republicans. Democratic Cohesion on All Issues is the standard deviation of the 
DW-NOMINATE Score for Democrats. Republican Cohesion on All Issues is the 
standard deviation of the DW-NOMINATE Score for Republicans.  
 
Consistent with my expectation, the parties exhibit less cohesion on foreign policy 
(this is particularly characteristic of Democrats), than they do on all issues. In contrast to 
my expectation, the presence of threat during in 1981–1988 and 2001–2005 does not 
appear to influence the amount of party cohesion.  
Analysis at the Congress Level 
In Figure 5, Polarization on FP (shown in dark blue) is the differences between 




Polarization on All Issues (shown in green) is the differences between Average 
Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score and Average Republican DW-NOMINATE Score per 
congress.  
Figure 5  
Polarization on Foreign Policy in 97th–112th Congresses 
 
Note: The dark blue markers indicate polarization on all issues, the green markers 
indicate polarization on FP. Polarization on FP is measured as the difference-in-
means between Average Democratic FPN Score and Average Republican FPN 
Score per congress. Polarization on All Issues is measured as the difference-in-
means between Average Democratic DW-NOMINATE Score and Average 
Republican DW-NOMINATE Score per congress. 
 
Figure 5 complements Figures 1–2, as Figure 5 simply shows the differences-in-
means between the average FPN and average DW-NOMINATE by party by congress. 
My expectation was that Polarization on FP would be lower (closer to 0) than 




occur during the times of foreign threat presence, i.e., during 97–100th congresses and 
during 107–109th congresses. No such pattern is emerging.  
In summary, I conclude that the data are largely inconsistent with my expectation 
(although some of the anticipated patterns were borne out in the data) that foreign threats 







This paper asked: how does the presence of a unifying foreign threat affect party 
cohesion and bipartisanship in the U.S. House? This is an important question, because 
understanding congressional response to such events is crucial information in 
understanding U.S. foreign policy and forecasting future responses to rising foreign 
threats. My expectation was based on the reality that legislators are careful with their 
votes because they don’t know which votes will become controversial in the next 
election. In addition to fear of electoral punishment, opposition from a foreign threat 
allows members of the House to prioritize their national identity over their party 
membership. I expected to see a rise in bipartisanship, and therefore a decline in party 
cohesion as party members abandoned party positions to compromise with the other 
party, in years were a perceived foreign threat was present. The anticipated pattern that 
US political parties facing foreign threats tend to reduce the distance between their voting 
on foreign policy and on all other issues were borne out in the data, yet these results are 
substantively modest. The descriptive analysis reveals that my expectations that foreign 
threats substantially reduce intraparty cohesion and inter-party polarization largely 
inconsistent with the data.  
First, when a party controls the majority in the House and the external threat is 
present, the majority members’ distance between voting on foreign policy and all other 
issues widens. In contrast, when a party is the minority in the House, the distance 
between the two scores shrinks in the face of an external threat. This implies that 
majorities—when confronting a foreign threat—moderate their positions on foreign 




minorities do (a smaller distance implies more alignment between FP and all other 
issues). This pattern is somewhat puzzling, since Democrats controlled the majority 
facing a threat from the USSR in 1981–1988 under a Republican president, but 
Republicans were in the majority in 2001–2005 under G.W. Bush, a Republican 
president. Further qualitative examination is needed to substantiate this finding. 
Second, my argument implied that that the gap between parties’ DW-
NOMINATE scores would grow faster over time than in FPN scores, but the descriptive 
analysis demonstrates that it does not appear to be the case. While party-level DW-
NOMINATE scores diverge from each other over time, the FPN scores do not exhibit 
any over time pattern dependent on the presence of foreign threats. Furthermore, I 
expected to observe reductions in polarization during the times of foreign threat presence, 
i.e., during 97–100th congresses and during 107–109th congresses. No such pattern 
emerges in the data. 
Third, consistent with my expectation, the parties exhibit less cohesion on foreign 
policy (this is particularly characteristic of Democrats), than they do on all issues. In 
contrast to my expectation, the presence of threat during in 1981–1988 and 2001–2005 
does not appear to influence the amount of party cohesion.  
The robustness checks in the appendix include the independent variable foreign 
threat recoded such that in one model, external threat takes on the value of 1 in 2001-
2002 only; another model includes external threat with a value of 1 in 1981-1991 only. 
There are several limitations of this work. One such limitation is the timeframe 
covered in this analysis. Future work should expand to include a broader stretch of time 




specifically at the Vietnam War would also provide interesting insight into how military 
engagement affects congressional behavior in the context of a broader foreign threat such 
as the Cold War. Additionally, future work should remove foreign policy votes from the 
DW-nominate comparison score such that FPN score is the only measure of member 
ideology on foreign policy. This would also provide an opportunity to conceptualize 
foreign policy differently. The category could be expanding to include votes on defense 
spending and other related issues or could be limited to a specific foreign policy issue 
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Table AI Measuring Polarization through Difference-in-means 
 
                                                Polarization on FP Polarization on all issues  
97th Congress  -0.799  -0.496  
98th Congress -0.809  -0.819  
99th Congress -0.837   -0.643  
100th Congress  -0.822   -1.036  
101st Congress -0.762   -0.873  
102nd Congress  -0.765   -0.875  
103rd Congress -0.758  -0.540  
104th Congress  -0.797  -1.081  
105th Congress  -0.801  -0.376  
106th Congress  -0.810  -0.808  
107th Congress  -0.928  -0.653  
108th Congress  -0.931  -0.481  




110th Congress  -0.933  -1.162  
111th Congress  -0.807  -0.193  
















Table AII: Standard Deviation Within Party Per Congress  
 
  
  Democrats Republicans 
  FPN Score  NOMINATE 
Score 
FPN Score NOMINATE 
Score 
 97th Congress 
 
0.412  0.195 0.257 0.167 
 98th Congress 
 
0.490  0.181 0.328 0.157 
 99th Congress  
 
0.361   0.167 0.274   0.148 
100th Congress 
 
0.307  0.165 0.254 0.155 
101st Congress  0.231  0.166 0.230 0.161 
102nd Congress   0.270  0.166 0.234 0.156 
103rd Congress  0.345  0.162 0.189 0.144 
104th Congress  0.319  0.152 0.159 0.155 
105th Congress  0.389  0.138 0.331 0.145 
106th Congress  0.253  0.139 0.175 0.147 
107th Congress  0.281  0.135 0.093 0.147 
108th Congress   0.132  0.133 0.066 0.143 
109th Congress   0.251  0.124 0.094 0.144 
110th Congress  0.188  0.135 0.109 0.146 
111th Congress   0.483  0.145 0.497 0.148 




Table AIII: Robustness Checks 
 
 (1)  (8)  (9) 
 All obs.  USSR  9/11 
 97–112th Congresses  




















Congress FEs Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  6,955    6,955     6,955 
Adjusted R2  0.0214    0.0214     0.0214 
Note: Numbers in cells are coefficient estimates, standard errors are in 
parentheses. Models fit with OLS regression. Dependent variable is Distance 
between DW-NOMINATE and FPN. * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Model 1 uses all individual-level observations. The presence of a unifying threat 
reduces the gap between the two scores by 0.082 units for all members of the House. The 
entire model has a poor fit; it explains 1.4% of variation in the distance between the two 
scores. Although the impact of External Threat is statistically discernible, this effect is 
substantively negligible, because it explains 0.2% of variation in the distance at the 
individual level (partial eta2 = .0016). Models 8 and 9 use a recoded Independent 
Variable. Model 8 uses external threat coded as 1 during 1981-1991 and 0 during all 
other years. Model 9 uses external threat coded as 1 during 2001-2002 and 0 during all 
other years. 
 
 
